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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
rendering of a default judgment upon failure of a party to appear or proceed to
trial, Relying on Mink v. Keim, 7 the Court reaffirmed its position that a
judgment under this section may be entered only upon a complaint or counterclaim. The defendant had no action on which to proceed since his property
damage action had been settled and his contention was accordingly rejected.
Separate Trial Where Insurance Company Joined as Party Defendant
In Kelly v. Yannotti,18 appellant, an insurance company, had been impleaded
by the defendant in a negligence action. When a jury trial was demanded,
appellant moved under section 96 of the Civil Practice Act to sever the actions.
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether denial of this motion by the
trial court constituted an abuse of discretion.
The New York courts have long held that in actions where insurance
companies are impleaded a finding that the plaintiff is entitled to recover might
influence the jury in its determination of the separate issue of whether defendant
was covered by the alleged insurance contract, or that conversely, a finding that
defendant is covered by insurance might influence the determination of plaintiff's
right to relief. Thus, motions for severance have been allowed so as not to have
the same jury pass on both issues. 19
In the present case the Court held that denial of the motion to sever
constituted an abuse of discretion since there would be no impairment of a
substantial right of any party and the insurance company probably would be
subject to some prejudice if the main action and the third party action were
tried by the same jury.
Res Judicata and Collaferal Esfoppel-Idenfity of Parties
In Commissioners v. Low, 20 the State Insurance Fund (workmen's compensation insurer for the State of New York) brought the action as statutory assignee
of the representative of a state employee, killed in an accident while on duty in a
state automobile. The suit was brought against the private motorist and owner of
the other car in the accident which resulted in the employee's death. Prior to this
action by the State Insurance Fund, the private motorist had himself sued the
State of New York on the theory that the accident was caused solely by the
17. 291 N.Y 300, 52 N.E.2d 444 (1943).
18. 4 N.Y.2d 603, 176 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1958).
19. See, e.g., Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479, 95 N.E. 10 (1911);
Taplin v. Stevens, 280 App. Div. 960, 117 N.Y.S.2d 606 (4th Dep't 1952); Warner v.
Star Co., 162 App. Div. 458, 147 N.Y.Supp. 803 (2d Dep't 1914); Delany v. Allen,
200 Misc. 734, 105 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup.Ct. 1951); Butera v. Donner, 177 Misc. 966,
32 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
20. 3 N.Y.2d 590, 170 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958).
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negligence of the deceased employee and had recovered judgment. In this action
by the StateFund, he pleaded that the accident, subject of both suits, was caused
solely by the employee, the State of New York, which the defendant identified
with .he State Insurance Fund, being bound by the prior judgment.
The Court of Appeals, acknowledging that there is no exact precedent on the
question of the identity of the State and the Fund for purposes of res judicata,
determined that this was not a quest.on of res judicata but rather a collateral
estoppel, and hence, in effect, determined that the State and State ;nsurance Fund
are two separate and distinct parties. Judge Desmond further stated that "[it
would be unreal to say that the plaintiffs in this present suit participated in the
prior suit and we are admonished to be cautious in extending these doctrines
[of res judicata] to cases where a party might be deprived of a full day in court."
In effect, then, the prior judgment was nothing more than persuasive precedent not binding upon the present suit. The decision appears to recognize the
realities of the situation wherein, in fact, the operations of the State of New York
and the State Insurance Fund are quite separate.
Notice of Amount on Summons for Default Judgment Not Restrictive of
Jurisdiction as to Causes of Actions Sued
Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Practice provides that if an action be brought
for the breach of an express or implied contract for a specific sum, and a
complaint is not served with the summons, plaintiff may serve with the summons
a notice stating the sum of money for which judgment will be taken in case of
default.
The Court in Everitt v. Everitt 1l was faced with the problem of whether,
after a general appearance had been entered by a non-resident defendant, plaintiff
could serve a complaint adding several causes of action to the initial cause
contemplated by the notice under Rule 46.
Defendant, a non-resident, was served with summons and notice while
temporarily within the state. She filed notice of general appearance and demanded
a complaint. Upon service of the complaint, the defendant moved to strike the
additional causes stated therein on the ground that she was not a person subject
to the jurisdiction of the court 2 This motion was granted by the Special
Term,23 and the second and third causes of action were dismissed. The Appellate
Division reversed, 24 and certified questions to the Court of Appeals as to whether
21.
22.
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24.

4 N.Y.2d 13, 171 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958).
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §237(a).
157 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup.Ct. 1956).
3 A.D.2d 413, 161 N.Y.SM 172 (1st Dep't 1957).

